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I. INTRODUCTION
The following is a critical analysis of Paul H. Nitze's 
"Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente." While 
Jan Lodal's "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative 
View," points to many problems in Nitze's analysis, it does
2 not address the central assertion made by Nitze. That is, 
Nitze argues that the trend in Soviet-American relative stra­
tegic forces is such that,
...the United States is moving toward a posture of min­
imum deterrence in which we would be conceding to the 
Soviet Union the potential for a military and political 
victory if deterrence failed.3
It is this provocative component of his analysis that is the 
focus of critical attention in this paper, for on the basis 
of it Nitze urges deployment of a partially mobile ICBM force.
Concerning Nitze's strategic analysis, three lines of 
criticism are pursued. One relates to the inappropriateness 
of Nitze's use of strategic throw-weight as the central measure 
of Soviet-American relative capabilities. Another line of crit­
icism disputes Nitze's view regarding the ease with which a 
counterforce strike can be executed. Third, Nitze's use of 
strategic throw-weight and his assumptions concerning counter­
force strikes combine to yield an unrealistic account of the 
probable course and outcome of a Soviet-American counterforce 
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exchange. In sum, it will be shown that the future of the 
Soviet-American strategic relationship is much more favorable 
to the United States than described by Nitze, and therefore 
his policy proposal is unnecessary and possibly destabilizing.
II. NITZE AND THE SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT ISSUE
Nitze's argument concerning the future potential Soviet 
war-winning capability rests on two premises. First, a 
Soviet-initiated exchange would be purely counterforce, and 
the objective of both the Soviet Union and the United States 
in such an exchange would be to destroy as much as possible
4 
of the opponent's strategic throw-weight. Second, the appro­
priate overall measure of post-attack residual capabilities
5 
would be strategic throw-weight.
Clearly the concept of throw-weight is central to Nitze's 
analysis, and it is this concept, usually defined as the weight 
of strategic weapons and associated instrumentation which may 
be carried by various delivery vehicles, which deserves critical 
attention. First, it is doubtful that throw-weight is an im­
portant factor as accuracy during a counterforce exchange.
As Lodal notes,
Unless accuracies are better than about 0.2 nautical 
miles (CEP), no reasonable MIRV system can have much 
of a counterforce capability; once accuracies are 
better than 0.1 nautical miles, essentially any size 
missile, even those of relatively low throw-weight, 
can destroy silos. (emphasis in original)6
Thus if the USSR attempts to compensate for accuracy problems 
by building larger missiles, it will at best only catch-up or 
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keep-up with US capabilities if the latter emphasizes accuracy 
improvements. On the other hand, if the USSR greatly improves 
its missile accuracies, then that component of its forces, not 
throw-weight, should be the focus of US attention.
Later discussion shows that Nitze is not oblivious to 
accuracy, but before turning to that, another point on throw­
weight may be appropriate. As noted above, Nitze places great 
emphasis on throw-weight as the appropriate measure of post­
counterforce residual capabilities. As he states,
It is the situation after attack (counterforce), of 
course, that is most important. And here, since the 
targets remaining after the exchange would almost all 
be soft ones, missile accuracy and other refinements 
in the original postures no longer have the same sig­
nificance. Surviving throw-weight thus becomes an 
appropriate total measure of residual capabilities 
on both sides. (emphasis in original)7
Not only does Nitze consider throw-weight appropriate, it is 
the only measure used in his analysis. Of course, he is cor­
rect insofar as he notes the lessened importance of accuracy 
when soft targets are attacked, but this does not, as shall be 
shown, justify the conclusion he draws, i.e., throw-weight is 
therefore appropriate as a measure of relative capabilities.
Assume that both sides engaged in counterforce attacks, 
and only soft targets remained. What then is more effective: 
a small number of large weapons, or a large number of small 
weapons? While it is perhaps counterintuitive, the latter is 
the answer. That is, much of the destructive energy of large 
weapons cannot extend itself beyond a certain distance from 
detonation. Analysts have observed that the effective yields 
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of strategic weapons are their nominal yield to the two-third 
power; thus larger weapons have much of their destructive po-
g
tential essentially "wasted." Further, many soft targets need 
only a small amount of destructive energy applied, and the vast 
destructive energy of large weapons merely overkills such targets.
Thus it is more efficient, in terms of countervalue attacks, 
to have available a large number of small weapons. It is irrel­
evant that the USSR may have greater throw-weight than the US 
after counterforce exchanges, unless such throw-weight disparities 
are translated into larger numbers of warheads. Rather than throw­
weight, numbers of warheads appear to be more appropriate as a 
measure of relative capabilities. As Enthoven and Smith observe,
If a single index is needed, the number of separately 
targetable warheads is the least unsatisfactory one, 
because the number of targets destroyed increases al­
most in direct proportion to increases in the number 
of warheads.9
Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara makes a similar argu­
ment:
...the most meaningful and realistic measurement of
nuclear capability is the number of separate warheads 
that can be delivered accurately on high-priority tar­
gets with sufficient power to destroy them.-'-®
As explicated below, after any conceivable counterforce attack 
on it by the USSR, the US will have the greater number of nuclear 
warheads. In fact, counterforce exchanges, even if initiated by 
the USSR, worsen the position of the USSR in this regard. If 
this is so, and if the number of warheads is the appropriate 
measure of capabilities, then it is hard to share Nitze's concern 
that the USSR might consider a counterforce attack.
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III. NITZE AND SOVIET COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES
The above discussion argues that throw-weight may not be 
as important as accuracy during a counterforce attack, and not 
as important as sheer numbers of warheads after an exchange. 
As regards throw-weight and accuracy, the former is signifi­
cant only within a fairly narrow range of values of the latter. 
Interestingly enough, Nitze assumes an accuracy within the band 
described by Lodal, but does not at all emphasize his accuracy 
factor. Perhaps doing so would reveal a weakness in his analy­
sis, for the accuracy he postulates for the new generation of 
Soviet ICBMs is exactly two times better than has been estimated 
recently by US intelligence officials.I1 This official estimate 
of 0.25 nm CEP is also quite inadequate in terms of the band of 
accuracies described by Lodal as necessary for counterforce 
attacks.
In any event, Nitze argues that with the deployment of 
SS-18s (which carry 8 one megaton weapons), and SS-19s (which 
carry 6 one-half megaton weapons), and assuming these new mis­
siles have accuracies of 0.125 nm CEP, then with only 2000 one 
megaton warheads carried by 250 SS-18s, the USSR could threaten
1292% of the American land-based ICBM force. At least in theory, 
Nitze’s scenario is both possible and disturbing. Given his 
assumptions, his calculations are essentially correct, and to 
the extent that his assumptions obtain, a relatively small por­
tion of the Soviet ICBM force could indeed threaten the bulk 
of the American ICBM force. This scenario, if realistic, could 
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create a perceived strategic relationship in which Soviet 
leaders might seem to have advantages over American leaders 
in a crisis situation, and from the American viewpoint this 
is obviously unacceptable.
However, evidence suggests that Nitze's assumptions, 
concerning the ease of a counterforce attack, need serious 
alteration, both in terms of achieved as opposed to expected 
accuracy, and the relationship of one attacking warhead to 
other warheads in the attack. First consider accuracy. When 
Nitze assumes an accuracy for Soviet missiles, he can only do 
so in terms of what the Soviets might expect as a result of 
test-firings of missiles. This raises some rather interesting 
observations made by (then) Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger 
in testimony before Congress in 1974. He noted that, for the 
US, regardless of accuracies estimated via test-firings, "We 
can never know what kinds of degrees of accuracy would be achieved 
in the real world." He noted that, "The parameters of the flights 
from western test ranges are not really very helpful in deter­
mining those accuracies to the Soviet Union." Finally, he noted 
that, "...there will always be a degradation in accuracy as one
13 shifts from R&D testing... to operational silos."
If the US is faced with real uncertainty regarding trans­
lation of test-flight accuracies into operational accuracies, 
then is it not fair to assume that the USSR experiences similar 
perceptions of uncertainty? Also, although Schlesinger did not 
explicite his understanding of the accuracy degradation problem, 
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one might speculate that several factors contribute to it, 
and that these factors similarly confront Soviet planners.
For example, the specific influences on accuracy of the grav­
itational pull of the sun and the moon, and the earth's mag­
netism as missiles go from the USSR to the US (or the reverse), 
might be difficult to forsee and accomodate to the extent 
needed for very small CEPs. Other factors might be the inter­
ference of static electronic fields, and local wind conditions. 
While advanced devices, such as terminal guidance systems, may 
be deployed with the purpose of minimizing such uncertainties, 
their very sensitivity might cause uncertainties concerning
14accuracy.
While it is not publicly known what impact accuracy degra­
dation has on counterforce capabilities, one can report that 
Schlesinger felt compelled to add 0.1 nm to Soviet and American 
CEP estimates solely on the basis of uncertainties he attributed
15
to accuracy degradation. If indeed it is more realistic to 
include such a degradation factor in counterforce calculations, 
then those suggested by Nitze, which fail to do so, should be 
viewed with a certain skepticism. To illustrate the implications 
of the degradation factor, the two silo-destruction functions 
indicated in Table I (see p. 8) are derived from the same assump­
tions used by Nitze with the sole exception of accuracy assumed 
for one of the functions. While the function, Threat A, (repre­
senting Nitze's calculations), assumes a 0.125 nm CEP, the 
function, Threat B, assumes a 0.225 nm CEP, reflecting Schlesinger's 
suggestion concerning the impact of accuracy degradation.
-8-
16
Table I: Soviet Counterforce Capabilities
Threat A
Assumptions
Yield: 1 Megaton
CEP: .125 nm
SSKP: .89 (air), .85 (ground)
OAR: .83
TKP: .74 (air), .71 (ground)
Silo Hardness: 1500 psi 
Operative Kill Probability: 
the average of air and ground 
burst detonations needed to 
destroy 92% of the US ICBMs.
Calculations
Pk1(air)=l-(1-.74)1= .74
Pk^(ground)=1-(1-.71)1=.71 
Pk2(air)=l-(l-.74)2= .93
Pk2(ground)=1-(1-.71)2=.92
Pk9(average 2 air & 2 ground 
--- burst RVs) =.925
The_Attack
If 2 RVs/silo targeted, and 
1000 silos attacked, then
1000 silos x .925 = 925 silos 
destroyed, or a little over 
92% of the US ICBM force.
Threat B
Assumptions
Yield: 1 Megaton
CEP: .225 nm
SSKP: .54 (air), .5 (ground)
OAR: .83
TKP: .48 (air), .415 (ground)
Silo Hardness: 1500 psi 
Operative Kill Probability: 
the average of air and ground 
burst detonations needed to 
destroy 92% of the US ICBMs.
Calculations
Pk (air)=l-(1-.48)1= .48
Pk1(ground)=1-(1-.415)1=.415
Pk4(air)=l-(l-.48)4= .95
Pk4 (ground)=1-(1-.415)4=.889
Pk.(average of 2 air & 2 ground 
___ burst RVs) =.92
Tl?e_Attack
If 4 RVs/silo targeted, and 
1000 silos attacked, then
1000 silos x .92 = 920 silos 
destroyed, or exactly 
92% of the US ICBM force.
Number of RVs used in the 
attack: 1000 silos x 2 RVs/
silo=2000 RVs.
Number of RVs used in the 
attack: 1000 silos x 4 RVs/
silo=4000 RVs.
Note that to threaten between 92% and 93% of the US ICBM 
under Threat A only about 2000 Soviet RVs are required, but 
that under Threat B some 4000 RVs are required for the same 
attack performance. Two observations become apparent on the 
basis of these crude calculations. First, without doubt 
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accuracy degradation levels approaching those suggested by 
Schlesinger drastically affect the efficiency of counter­
force strategies. While Threat A required relatively few
*RVs to attack many silos successfully, degradation of 0.1 nm 
or 80% requires an increase of 2000 RVs, or 100%, in order 
to attain the same destruction level. Second, enormous uncer­
tainty enters into counterforce scenarios once accuracy degra­
dation is taken into account. If the USSR uses only 2000 RVs, 
but finds that 4000 were needed, there may not be enough time 
to attack with the additional RVs before the US releases its 
ICBMs which survived the first attack.
There are also problems with Nitze's assumptions regard­
ing the interaction of warheads as they attack a single target 
such as a missile silo. Nitze's assumptions are reflected by 
the calculations in Table I, i.e., warheads are assumed to com­
plement each other's performance in such a fashion as to treat 
the overall probability of a silo kill as being the probalistic 
function of the number of warheads targeted against the silo. 
However, a recent article by McGlinchey and Seelig makes the 
opposite case, that warheads will in fact interfere with each 
other's performance.
For example, they describe the problem of "neutron flux." 
The explosion of the first warhead may generate such a great 
amount of neutron atoms that succeeding warheads "...can be so 
affected that either the material will fail to initiate the 
nuclear reaction, or the reaction will occur with a reduced 
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yield."17 The high radiation and shock wave created by the 
first explosion also might negatively affect warheads fol­
lowing it. The radiation may render radar and inertial fuses 
inoperative, compelling the use of contact fuses, which ac-
18 cording to the authors degrades warhead accuracy. The shock 
wave has two negative affects. First, if an RV is close be­
hind an exploding warhead, the latter's shock wave may create 
a "...deceleration load that will exceed the reentry vehicle's
19 structural strength," thereby destroying the second vehicle. 
Alternatively, if the second RV is placed further behind the 
warhead about to detonate, the former's trajectory "...may be 
deflected by the shock front, but, more importantly, it will 
traverse regions behind the front where air density and winds
20 are very different from those predicted for normal reentry."
This of course confirms the concept of accuracy degradation 
resulting from real world conditions rather than test-flights 
of strategic systems. Finally, there is the problem of the 
"mushroom clouds" caused by either air or ground burst detona­
tions. While the problem is very acute for the latter detona­
tion form, a Defense Department study of nuclear blasts found 
that the phenomena occurs with both forms, and is particularly 
sensitive to increases in yield, which of course means the
21 problem is associated especially with the large Soviet warheads. 
With the first warhead's detonation, there would develop rapidly 
an upward moving air stream which would pull up dust and debris 
into what would appear as a mushroom cloud. McGlinchey and
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Seelig observe that, "Reentry vehicles can be disabled if
they pass through the high density stem ... or if they are 
22struck by debris."
Strategic analysts are still in the process of learning
how to include the fratricide phenomenon into counterforce
calculations. One interpretation is that it constrains se­
verely the number of warheads targeted against each silo,
limits the detonation form employed by the attacker, and,
23finally, creates time problems for the attacker. Consider 
for example the following hypothetical ICBM system:
Illustration I
Squadron C
Squadron B
Squadron A
One possible strategy for an attacker might be to lay down 
a barrage of one warhead per silo, and have all of the warheads 
land simultaneously. However, after completion of the attack, 
no further RVs could attack the more southern squadrons (B and
A), in that the dust and debris raised by detonations over
Squadron C would endanger RVs passing overhead on their way to
B and A. Thus for an hour or so, fratricide problems would
"mask" or "shield" Squadrons B and A from further attacks.
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Therefore, unless an attacker is extremely confident 
about the performance of one attacking RV per silo, serious 
fratricide-related problems complicate targeting plans. 
Further, it should be noted that an attacker using more than 
one RV per silo would most likely want to take advantage of 
both air and ground burst detonations. The former is parti­
cularly adept at cracking the shields of attacked silos, and 
the latter offers the advantage of cratering which tilts a 
silo in such a fashion as to render its missile inoperable. 
However, ground bursts are particularly prone to displacing 
dust and debris, and therefore an attacker wishing to capi­
talize on the advantages of ground bursts must reckon with 
especially acute fratricide problems.
Thus, if an attacker employs two RVs per silo, then the 
attack must consist of first using air burst detonated RVs 
against the southernmost silos (in the above, Squadron A), 
wait until the fireball subsides in order to avoid radiation 
problems (a matter of perhaps 30 seconds), and then attack 
with RVs detonated in the ground burst mode. As the second 
wave of RVs detonate in Squadron A, silos in Squadron B may 
be attacked with air burst detonated RVs. Note, however, 
that Squadron C may not be attacked until all detonations are 
completed in Squadron A and the second wave of RVs enters in­
to Squadron B. A Department of Defense official reported to 
this student that the above process of "walking up" an attack 
against US ICBMs would require an hour. After it is completed, 
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no additional RVs could be committed until after the dust 
and debris settle in the northern silo fields. This would 
require a lull in the attack of one hour. Thus the total 
time to launch two salvos of two RVs per US silo would be, 
according to a Defense Department official, around three 
hours.
An alternative attack mode might be to target three
RVs per silo, e.g., two air and one ground burst detonations.
In this case an attacker would place one set of air burst 
detonated RVs in Squadron A, wait, send another salvo, again 
wait, and then send a final salvo of RVs detonated in the 
ground burst mode. Only as this last salvo enters into 
Squadron A may the attack begin against Squadron B, and so 
on from South to North. This strategy is reported by the 
official to require three to four hours of execution. Obvi­
ously if there are doubts about accuracy it would be more 
rational to attack with two salvos of two RVs per silo, for 
more RVs may be used in this attack mode than can be used 
in the three RV per silo mode, but both require the same 
amount of time for execution.
Interestingly enough, after either attack mode is com­
pleted, a large amount of dust and debris would remain in the 
atmosphere even after a substantial amount of time had elapsed. 
Thus an attacker would have difficulties with and therefore 
little confidence in satellite reconnaissance in determining 
which silos had been destroyed in the first salvo. As a result, 
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an attacker contemplating two salvos of RVs may need to tar­
get all silos in the second salvo, even though many silos 
would be destroyed in the first salvo. The time urgency of 
an attack might compel such a costly targeting decision.
After the hour elapses between attacks, use of satellite re­
connaissance would require additional time to make observa­
tions, report them to attack authorities, and make appropriate 
targeting choices. Moreover, while an hour is needed before 
the second attack may begin, more time might be required for 
clearing of the air space above the silos such that satellites 
can be used with high confidence. In sum, a cautious attack 
planner may have little confidence in "shoot-look-shoot" stra­
tegies; rather, an attacker may feel compelled to take the 
safer path of targeting all silos in the second salvo, even 
though this is very costly in terms of warheads committed to 
the attack.
Thus accuracy degradation and strategic fratricide com­
bine to complicate severely a potential attacker's counter­
force strategy. On the one hand, degradation in accuracy 
makes unlikely that an attacker can rely upon the performance 
of only one RV per silo. On the other hand, fratricide makes 
the effectiveness of more than one RV per silo very uncertain, 
for the attacker is constrained in terms of the number and 
detonation forms of the RVs used in the attack. Most seriously, 
fratricide compels an attacker to leave unmolested large numbers 
of enemy missiles for relatively long periods of time (relative 
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that is, to the time necessary to release missiles not yet 
under attack). Nitze fails completely to acknowledge, ad­
dress, or include in his analysis these problems for an at­
tacker, and therefore his discussion of possible Soviet 
counterforce capabilities must be considered greatly flawed.
IV. NITZE AND AMERICAN COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES
When the total Soviet and American strategic arsenals 
are introduced into counterforce scenarios, and if it is 
agreed that the most appropriate post-counterforce exchange 
measure of relative capabilities is the number of warheads 
remaining in strategic arsenals (rather than throw-weight), 
then a Soviet first-strike becomes much more unattractive 
than described by Nitze. As sketched in Table II, one might 
assume a maximum Soviet MIRVed ICBM program, a partially 
MRVed SLBM force, and one hundred bombers. A plausible Amer­
ican posture (say, by 1990), might have a total of strategic 
launchers below the proposed SALT II ceiling, but having as 
alterations to the present posture large numbers of B-l 
bombers, B-52s fitted with SRAMS (Short Range Attack Missiles), 
Trident SSBNs, and all of the Poseidon SSBNs retrofitted with 
Trident I missiles.
Thus for the Soviets a vast program is assumed; they 
are just beginning to deploy their new ICBMs (some components 
are still being tested), and they have just tested a MRVed 
SLBM. On the American side, the B-l is a new but already 
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announced and fairly assured addition, and the number of 
Tridents deployed is assumed to remain as currently planned. 
Also, note that many of the B-52s currently in the US arsenal 
are assumed to be phased out as the B-l is procured; if fewer 
B-ls are eventually procured that presently assumed, but more 
B-52s are retained, then US bomber capabilities would remain 
fairly constant. Thus the only major innovation made in the 
analysis is the retrofitting of the entire 31 Poseidon SSBN 
fleet with Trident I missiles, rather than the currently 
planned retrofitting of only 10 Poseidons.
24Table II; The Strategic Balance
Launcher System Number Deployed Warheads/Launcher Warheads 
(a) The USSR
Total American Warheads:
SS-19 1012 6 6072
SS-18 308 8 2464
other ICBM 180 1 180
SS-N-6-M3 544 3 (MRVs) 1632
other SLBMs 256 1 256
Bombers (Bear) 100 1 (kangaroo 100
missile)
Total Soviet Warheads: 10,704
The US
Minuteman III 550 3 1650
Minuteman II 450 1 450
Trident I 760 8 6080
B-l Bomber 240 24 (SRAMs) 5760
B-52 G/H 295 24 (20 SRAMs , 6120
4 bombs)
20,060
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In sum, prior to any sort of exchange, the USSR would 
have about 10,704 warheads, or about 50% of the US arsenal 
of 20,060 warheads. Even under the best conceivable circum­
stances, i.e., Nitze’s scenario, the USSR would need to in­
vest 2000 warheads or 18% of its strategic arsenal to destroy 
1940 US warheads or less than 10% of the latter's arsenal. 
After such an attack, and prior to an American response, the 
Soviet position would actually deteriorate slightly: rather 
than having 50% of the US arsenal, after the attack postulated 
by Nitze the USSR would have 48% of the US arsenal in terms of 
warheads. Thus it is difficult to observe any massive Soviet 
strategic advantage gained by striking first, at least in 
terms of warheads; at best, the USSR remained about where it 
started, even if a near perfect strike is executed.
Consider, however, two scenarios in which the US responds 
in kind to the Soviet counterforce strike. (The calculations 
for the scenarios can be found in Appendix I). At one extreme 
is what one might call the Soviet best case: Soviet missiles 
have a 0.125 nm CEP (the accuracy used in the Nitze analysis), 
and American missiles, while they have the same test-flight 
CEP, encounter accuracy degradation problems such that the 
Schlesinger-suggested 0.1 nm degradation factor is added to 
the American accuracy. Thus American missiles have an accuracy 
of 0.225 nm CEP. At the other extreme accuracy assumptions 
are reversed: Soviet missiles have a 0.225 nm CEP, while Amer­
ican missiles have a 0.125 nm CEP accuracy. This scenario may 
be thought of as the Soviet worst case.
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Note also that after the USSR completes its attack 
against the US ICBM system, there would probably be few hard 
targets remaining in the US, and attacks by the USSR on US 
soft targets would very probably provoke an American response 
in kind. Therefore, the USSR may not be able to attack new 
American targets so long as the US response to the initial 
Soviet attack remains directed against Soviet ICBMs. Thus 
the USSR cannot release its missiles during the US counter­
force response, for effectively it has already attacked all 
permissible targets. Thus the US would have the time neces­
sary to execute a counterforce attack taking into account 
fratricide problems.
In the USSR best case, only 250 SS-18s destroy 920 
Minuteman silos, leaving 1250 Soviet ICBMs as targets for the 
US. If the US responds with 5000 Trident I warheads (leaving 
1080 as a reserve), the Soviet surviving force consists of 
about 35 SS-18s, 549 SS-19s, 180 unMIRVed ICBMs, and their 
entire bomber and SSBN forces, yielding about 5742 warheads 
or about 49% of the pre-exchange Soviet arsenal. The US, 
losing most of its ICBM force, and expending 5000 Trident I 
warheads in its counterforce response, would have remaining 
its bomber force, 1080 sea-based warheads, and some land- 
based warheads, yielding 13,100 warheads, or 65% of its pre­
exchange arsenal. The US proportion of its pre-exchange 
arsenal is greater than that of the USSR after a perfect
Soviet attack. Also, in terms of warheads the USSR would 
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have 43% of the US arsenal after the exchange, compared to 
50% before the exchange, a net decrease of 14% for the USSR 
in relative capabilities.
Now consider the Soviet worst case. In this scenario 
the USSR would use its entire force of 308 SS-18s, as well 
as 256 SS-19s, leaving as targets 756 SS-19s, and 180 unMIRVed 
ICBMs. If the US commits a total of 5 Trident I warheads per 
silo (done in such a fashion as to account for fratricide 
problems), the USSR surviving arsenal would contain 114 SS-19s 
47 unMIRVed ICBMs, and its SSBN and bomber forces, totaling 
2719 warheads. For the US, there would remain its bomber 
force, 100 ICBMs, and a Trident reserve of 1400 warheads, 
totaling 13,480 warheads. While the US has almost two-thirds 
of its arsenal remaining, the USSR has only one-fourth of 
its pre-exchange arsenal in terms of warheads. Also, Soviet 
relative capabilities vastly deteriorate in this scenario: 
from the 50% pre-exchange ratio, the USSR after a counterforce 
exchange with the US would have only about 20% of the US force 
in terms of warheads, a decrease in USSR strength relative to 
the US approaching 60%.
The above analysis yields at least three observations. 
First, under the best of circumstances, the USSR would stay 
only at about the same level of relative strength as the US 
via a first strike. Second, regardless of circumstances, with 
a US response to the USSR attack, the USSR strategic position 
would deteriorate as a result of the exchange it initiated.
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Third, after an exchange the US unquestionably would have 
the forces needed to threaten the existence of Soviet soci­
ety, thus denying the USSR any possibility of escaping un­
acceptable damage as a result of its attack. In sum, the 
USSR would suffer severely if it were to execute a first 
strike, and in fact a Soviet first strike would enhance 
American strategic superiority in terms of warheads. This 
obviously contradicts Nitze's claim that the US might soon 
concede to the USSR "the potential for a military and polit­
ical victory if deterrence failed" (see above, p. 1).
The above analysis must confront several criticisms.
For example, it assumes that warhead totals should be the 
measure of capabilities, and that small warheads can be 
compared on an equal basis with large weapons. In response: 
as noted above, it is the greater number of warheads which 
is the most efficient means against soft targets, (and only 
soft targets would remain after a counterforce exchange), 
and small weapons approach equality with large weapons 
against soft targets. Thus in this crucial category the USSR 
would suffer by striking first, and therefore US deterrence 
can be said to be strong. Thus Nitze's fear, that deterrence 
might fail, rests on a very weak foundation.
Also, it might be argued that US warhead superiority is 
based on its bomber force, and therefore its lead is illusory, 
for bombers have a doubtful survival and penetration capability 
compared to ICBMs and SLBMs. Two responses can be made to this 
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point. First, the US could hedge against these problems by 
maintaining an SLBM reserve, as is assumed in the above dis­
cussion. Second, while the US may have doubts about its 
bomber penetration capability, the USSR might have doubts 
about its bomber interdiction capability. In considering 
a first strike, the USSR must take into account the problem 
of interdicting some 500 American bombers capable of deliv­
ering up to 12,000 strategic weapons (each with a minimum 
yield of 200 kilotons), and only a few of these bombers 
would need to reach and attack high-value targets in order
25to destroy Soviet society. Surely, no rational Soviet 
leader would consider this a problem easily dismissed. Ob­
viously this uncertainty on the part of the USSR concerning 
the US bomber threat would serve as a deterrent against a 
Soviet first strike, and again the future US-USSR strategic 
balance is more stable than suggested by Nitze.
Additionally, the Soviets themselves would be faced with 
vulnerability and penetration problems, even if they consider 
using their forces first. It is quite likely that 100 rather 
aged Soviet bombers are at least as vulnerable when trying to 
penetrate American air space as 500 vastly more advanced Amer­
ican bombers attempting to penetrate Soviet air space, even 
though there are more extensive Soviet air defenses. Also, 
Soviet SSBNs do not have the same operating and evasion capa­
bilities as enjoyed by the American fleet, and therefore the 
USSR would probably have more to fear from anti-submarine 
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warfare. This too serves to deter possible Soviet expec­
tations that advantages can be derived from a first strike.
A third criticism might be that the above analysis over­
states US bomber and SLBM forces because many of these non­
alert forces would be destroyed in a first-strike. While 
admittedly a serious criticism, one may reply that it would 
be most difficult for the USSR to launch an attack which 
caught the US very much by surprise, and US forces caught 
on the ground or in pens would be small. In contemplating 
a strike, the USSR would want to deploy its own forces to 
the maximum, thus giving warning to the US. Also, the 
USSR cannot expect to reduce US forces via a mixed ICBM/SLBM, 
for as noted by James Schlesinger in the 1975 Posture State­
ment, it would be extremely difficult for the USSR to coor­
dinate a mixed attack which would not give adequate warning
27 to either the US ICBM or bomber forces.
Finally, Nitze and thus far this analysis assume that 
a Soviet counterforce attack is responded to in kind by the 
US, i.e., with US counterforce strikes. There is actually 
no reason why the USSR could be assured of such a response, 
and the US might even have cause to respond to a Soviet 
counterforce attack with a limited countervalue strike. Of­
ficial estimates suggest that between 3 and 16 million Amer­
icans would die immediately during a "purely counterforce"
2 8Soviet strike. If the US decided to go directly to counter­
value strikes, it would have many more warheads in its arsenal, 
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for it would not use the bulk of its SLBM force against So­
viet ICBMs. US countervalue capabilities would therefore 
increase relative to those of the USSR, for the increase in 
US SLBM forces by withholding from a counterforce strike 
would be greater than the USSR forces that would have been 
destroyed by an American attack. Of course, it is debatable 
whether the US would retaliate in such a manner, but at the 
same time the USSR cannot be sure that the US would not so 
respond to a Soviet counterforce attack that killed so many 
Americans. This too serves as a deterrent to a Soviet first- 
strike, and, again, strategic stability is greater than 
suggested by Nitze.
V. CONCLUSION: NITZE AND THE MX MISSILE
Thus while Nitze considers throw-weight the appropriate 
measure of strategic forces, a strong argument exists that the 
number of warheads is a more useful measure. While Nitze 
considers a successful Soviet first-strike rather easily 
achieved, the above argues that such an attack would be ex­
tremely difficult. While Nitze fears that if the USSR strikes 
first it would be in a position superior to the US, and might 
threaten to or actually strike during a crisis, the present 
analysis suggests that such a course of action would be 
gravely dangerous for the USSR, and therefore deterrence is 
much more assured in the future than argued by Nitze. Thus 
a final issue is raised: Nitze's proposal for deployment of 
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up to 10,000 partially hardened shelters to which US ICBMs 
would be dispersed if they were threatened. In light of 
the forces required to target all shelters, the USSR would 
consider a first-strike futile, and stability is thereby
, 29assured.
Nitze's proposal attracts several criticisms. If future 
stability is already likely, as argued in this paper, then 
Nitze's plan is unnecessary. Further, there is the problem 
of the enormous cost of such a plan; estimates run between 
$12 and $50 billion.There are also vast political problems 
with his proposal. As noted by Michael Nacht, a shelter system 
would be 'the ultimate shell game,' and would gravely impair
31strategic arms agreements. With verification of forces 
made extremely difficult, the USSR might consider a US shelter 
system a cover for covert ICBM deployments, and might therefore 
respond with increased Soviet deployments. The result of 
Nitze's proposal could very well be an accelerated arms race. 
Additionally, if the SALT process were aborted, the resulting 
mutual recriminations as to the responsibility for such a turn 
of events would strain greatly Soviet-American relations. 
Finally, less destabilizing alternatives may be available to
32protect American ICBMs.
Unfortunately, the US Government appears to be going in 
the direction opposite that suggested by the above analysis. 
The thrust of the new ICBM program, the MX missile, appears to 
be towards a shelter system. While $41 million was spent in
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FY 1976 to study all basing modes, $35.1 million was requested 
for FY 1977 just for study of basing modes "employing multiple
33deceptive aimpoints," i.e., the Nitze plan. In fact, the MX 
program, using a multiple launch-point basing mode, appears to 
be accelerating. It was reported recently that the Air Force 
will request $400 million in FY 1978 for a "project validation 
phase" of the MX missile. It was also reported that the Air 
Force plan is to "move directly to a mobile basing mode" if a
34decision is made to procure the MX. Yet, if the above dis­
cussion is correct, then for the forseeable future there is no 
real strategic need for a shelter system.
This is not to say that the US may be complacent about 
the future of the Soviet-American strategic relationship. In 
the distant future it is quite possible that both sides will 
acquire capabilities such that each might theoretically threaten 
the other's ICBMs with high confidence. While new US forces 
and deployment modes might then be a rational response, the arms 
control route should also be studied as a solution to the ICBM 
vulnerability problem. Of course, the arms control route prob­
ably would require a rather long time period for successful 
completion (this, in any event, has been our experience thus 
far), but as noted, we need not worry for the forseeable future 
about ICBM vulnerability. Thus, after (and assuming) a SALT II 
accord is finalized, the US will have ample time to pursue addi­
tional arms control arrangements whose aim can be to assure 
long-term stability. The crucial point with respect to Nitze 
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is that his proposal might very well jeopardize those future 
arms control efforts. It is therefore suggested that his plan 
not be adopted, and that instead the US Government pursue a 
long-term policy heavily emphasizing arms control as the solu­
tion to the future ICBM vulnerability problem. Thus the sta­
bility sought by Nitze can be achieved without embarking on the 
problematic course he advocates, and the net impact might be 
greater security for the Nation.
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Appendix I
1. Introduction
Employing some of the data found in Tables I and II, 
it is possible to construct very rough models of possible 
Soviet-American counterforce exchanges. In contrast to the 
use by Nitze of throw-weight as the key measure of the out­
come of such an exchange, this analysis uses the resulting 
number of warheads remaining on each side after an exchange 
as the central measure of relative residual capabilities. 
Hopefully it will be shown that regardless of circumstances 
the USSR cannot achieve a strategic advantage via a first- 
strike, 
posed b^
This thesis is of course the opposite 
Nitze.
of that pro-
2. Case I: The Soviet Best Case
(A) Assumptions for USSR (A' ) Assumptions for US
CEP: 0.125 nm CEP: 0 .225 nm
OAR: 0.83 OAR: 0 .83
Yield(SS-18) 1 Megaton Yield(TridentI) 100 kt
SSKP (SS-18) .85 (ground) SSKP 11 .14 (ground)
II .89 (air) 11 .16 (air)
TKP .71(ground) TKP 11 .12 (ground)
11 .74 (air) II .13 (air)
Pk ”
(2) . 92 (ground) Pk(2)
II .23 (ground)
Pk "FK(2) .93 (air) Pk(2)
II .24 (air)
Assume . 93 Assume Pk(2) . 235
(B) The Exchange
The USSR attacks with 250 SS-■18s, or 2000 1MT RVs,
against the entire Minuteman force of 1000 launchers. Achieved
is a 93% destruction rate. After the attack, there are 1250 
Soviet ICBMs in reserve, 1070 of which are MIRVed. The US is 
assumed to have deployed its Bomber force to secure bases. The 
US attacks with its SLBM force. Keeping 1080 Trident I war­
heads as a reserve, the US may use 5000 RVs in its response, 
or 5 RVs/silo if only the MIRVed forces are attacked. Because 
the bulk of the US ICBM force is already destroyed, it is as­
sumed that the US would have a relatively great amount of time 
to respond, for the Soviets no longer would have hard targets 
to attack. Attacks on soft targets might lead to escalation 
to countervalue attacks, and both sides probably would wish to 
avoid such a development. Thus if the US response is two waves 
of two RVs per silo, followed by a third wave of 1 RV per silo, 
the time of attack would be 1 hour for the first wave + 1 hour 
wait + 1 hour for the second wave + 1 hour wait + .5 hour for 
the third wave = 4.5 hours. (This compares with 1 hour for the 
Soviet attack). The US attack would be as follows:
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1000 targets
235 Pk’ (average of Pk of 2 air and 2 ground burst detonations)
235”
765 targets which survived the first wave
.235 Pk (2)
179 targets destroyed in the second wave
586 targets which survived the second wave
.13 Pk.. . , ..(1 airburst)
73 targets destroyed in the third wave
Total targets destroyed: 487 (or .487 overall kill probability)
Total targets survived : 513
Remaining are:
(1) For the USSR: launcher
68 SS-18s - (.487)(68) = 35 SS-18s
932 SS-19s - (.487) (932)= 479 SS-19s
Untargeted SS-19s = 70 SS-19s
UnMIRVed ICBMs (untargeted) 180
800 SLBM with warheads totaling... 
100 Bombers
RVs/launcher
8
6
6
1
1
Warheads
280
2874
420
180
1888
100
Total Surviving Soviet Warheads 5742
(2) For the US:
70 ICBMs, of which,
35 are Minuteman III
35 are Minuteman II
3
1
105
35
SLBM reserve = 135 Trident Is 8 1080
Bomber force 495 24 11880
Total Surviving American Warheads 13100
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(C) Results
1. Pre-exchange ratio
2. Post-exchange ratio
3. Post-exchange ratio
4. Post-exchange ratio
5. Change: .43-.50/.5
: SU-./US, = 10704/20060 = . 50
: SUVSUr = 5742/10704 = .49
: USyUST- = 13100/20060 = .65
: SU,/US^ = 5742/13100 = .43
x 100 = -.14%
Thus after a mutual counterforce exchange using the above 
assumptions, the Soviet position in terms of warheads de­
teriorates by 14%.
3. Case II: The Soviet Worst Case
(A) Assumptions for USSR
CEP: 0.225 nm
OAR: 0.83
Yield: SS-18: 1 Megaton 
SS-19:.5 Megaton
SSKP: SS-18:.5 (ground)
" :.54(air)
SS-19:.35(ground)
" :.39(air)
TKP: SS-18:.415(ground)
" :.48(air)
SS-19:.29(ground)
" :.32(air)
Pk,_.: SS-18:.65(ground)
( " :.73(air)
SS-19:.50(ground)
" :.54(air)
Pk (average of 2 air and 2 
SS-18:.70
(A') Assumptions for US
CEP: 0.125 nm
OAR: 0.83
Yield: (Trident I): 100 kt
SSKP:
fl
TKP:
II
Pk„ :
II
Pk (average of 
ground):
ground):
. 38 (ground)
.42 (air)
. 31 (ground)
. 35 (air)
.52 (ground)
.58(air)
2 air and 2
.55
SS-19:.52
(B) The Exchange
With the above assumptions, the USSR cannot achieve 
the same silo destruction level as in Case I using only one 
salvo of RVs. On the other hand, fratricide problems prevent 
the USSR from adding RVs to a single salvo; thus the USSR must 
use a strategy much more costly in time. This of course makes 
an attack much more risky. But, assuming that the USSR has 
three hours, it could send two salvos of RVs. The attack is 
as follows:
2464 SS-18s, or 1232 1 Megaton RV pairs, thus
1000 Minuteman targets
•70 Pk(2)
700 Minuteman silos destroyed in first wave;
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300 targets survive, of which in the second wave,
232 targeted with SS-18s
.70 Pk(2)
68 targeted with SS-19s 
Pk
(2 SS-19 RVs)
35 targets destroyed
33 survive second wave;
or about 90%.
162 targets destroyed
70 survive second wave
Total silos destroyed: 897 
Total Silos survive : 103.
Note that in both waves all Minuteman silos are targeted, 
even though many are destroyed in the first wave; this re­
flects the time urgency of the attack and problems with 
surveillance. Thus 2464 SS-18 RVs and 1536 SS-19 RVs in 
the attack, or
2464 SS-18 RVs or 308 SS-18 missiles
1536 SS-19 RVs or 256 SS-19 missiles 
4000 RVs and 564 missiles used in the attack.
Remaining would be 756 SS-19s and 180 unMIRVed Soviet ICBMs as 
targets for the American counterforce response. Using the same 
targeting strategy as in Case I, with 4970 Trident I warheads 
the US would still have a reserve of 1400. The attack would be 
as follows:
936
.55
514 targets destroyed in first wave,
422 targets survived first wave 
.55 pk(2)
231 targets destroyed in second wave
191 targets
.31 Pkairburst)
59 targets destroyed in third wave.
Total silos destroyed: 804 (or .86 overall kill ratio)
Total silos survived : 132
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Remaining are:
(1) For
756
180
the USSR:
SS-19s - (.86) (756) = 114
unMIRVed ICBMs-(.86)(180)=47
800
100
launchers RVs/launcher
6
1
SLBMs with total 
Bombers 1
Warheads
684
47 
of 1888
180
Warheads 2719SovietTotal Surviving
(2) For the US:
100 ICBMs, of which,
50 Minuteman III 3
50 Minuteman II 1
SLBM Reserve 175 Trident I 8
Bomber force 495 B-ls and B-52s 24
150
50
1400 
11880
Total Surviving American Warheads 13480
(C) Results
1. Pre-exchange ratio
2. Post-exchange ratio
3. Post-exchange ratio
4. Post-exchange ratio
5. Change: .21 - .50/.
SU,/US1 = 10704/20060 = .50
Sui/AUT’ = 2719/10704 = .25
US,/USr = 13480/20060 = .66
SU,/US, = 2719/13480 = .21
x 100 1 = -58%
Thus after a mutual counterforce exchange using the above 
assumptions, the Soviet position in terms of warheads 
deteriorates by 58%.
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